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Abstract 
Ex-ante impact assessment of agricultural, environmental, and rural policies has become an 
integral part of political decision making processes in the EU. While there is a large variety of 
agri-environmental modelling tools available to analyse likely social, economic, and 
environmental impacts of these policies, scientifically well-founded ex-ante policy assessment 
tools capturing institutional dimensions are still missing. In this paper, we introduce a 
formalised procedure for modelling – ex-ante – institutional aspects for policy 
implementation: the ‘Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ (PICA). It has 
recently been developed within the SEAMLESS project as a component of an integrative 
modelling framework for ex-ante assessment of policy impacts on sustainable development. 
PICA is based on the assumption that the effectiveness of a policy and the cost-effectiveness 
of its implementation largely depend on the degree of compatibility between this policy and 
the institutional context in the respective countries and regions. It has been designed as an 
explorative and flexible, yet formalised methodology that enables policy makers to identify at 
an early stage potential institutional incompatibilities. After providing a brief overview of 
relevant approaches for policy assessment we elaborate on the four distinct steps of PICA and 
use a core element of the EU Nitrate Directive to illustrate its function. 
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1 Introduction 
There is an urgent need for scientifically well-founded ex-ante policy assessment from an 
institutional perspective. Ex-ante impact assessments in general have become an integral and 
systematic part of the political decision making processes at EU level but also at national 
level in Member States (Bäcklund et al. 2007; EC 2005). Here, the analysis of likely social, 
economic, and environmental impacts is more and more often to be complemented by an 
assessment of institutional dimensions (EC 2005). Currently, however, institutional policy 
analysis focuses mainly on ex-post policy impact studies to evaluate past policy performance. 
While there is a vast amount of institutional ex-post case studies and indicator databanks, 
institutional economists have not yet developed standardised procedures using this 
information for making predictions of the institutional feasibility of policies. Similarly, there 
is a need that such standardised procedures can easily be linked with environmental and 
agricultural models widely used for policy impact assessment. Both issues point at substantial 
theoretical and methodological challenges inherent in the analysis of institutions for 
sustainable resource use. Such critical aspects encompass, for example, the question of how to 
capture the incentive structure faced by individuals in different decision-making contexts, 
bounded rational behaviour, informal institutions that form an important part of the 
institutional environment, and the complexity of transactions related to nature (Hagedorn et 
al. 2002). Clearly, these problems become even more aggravated in the endeavour of 
developing tools for a standardised ex-ante institutional analysis of policies.  
In this paper, we introduce a formalised procedure for modelling – ex-ante – institutional 
aspects for policy implementation: the ‘Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ 
(PICA). It has recently been developed in the frame of the SEAMLESS project that is one of 
the leading research projects in the field of agri-environmental policy impact assessment in 
Europe (Schleyer et al. 2007a). In this project, an ambitious integrative modelling framework 
for ex-ante assessment of policy impacts on sustainable development has been created. This 
so-called ‘SEAMLESS-Integrated Framework’ has been designed not only to assess the 
policies’ likely impacts on environmental, economic, and social systems, but it also has to 
provide indications on whether a policy under scrutiny is feasible from an institutional 
perspective and, thus, can be expected to become effective (van Ittersum et al. 2007). In this 
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context, PICA has been developed as an explorative and flexible, yet formalised methodology 
to assess the compatibility between policy options1 and various institutional contexts.  
Following an overview about prominent approaches for policy assessment in Section 2, we 
outline in Section 3 the basic assumptions leading to the concept of institutional compatibility 
we use in this paper. In Section 4, we elaborate on all four distinct steps of PICA, while in 
subsequent Section 5 we focus on PICA Step 1: the classification system to derive distinct 
policy types. PICA Step 1 is a crucial and the most generic step within the procedure 
determining the focus of the subsequent steps. In Section 6, different modes of action of the 
procedure will be illustrated using particular elements of the EU Nitrate Directive as a policy 
example. In the concluding Section 7, we discuss the importance of PICA as an explorative 
tool within the policy making process as well as options for methodological improvements. 
2 Overview of Approaches for Policy Assessment  
Policy analysis guides the process of selecting appropriate policy options to be put into 
practice. The analysis is commonly subdivided into two categories: ex-ante and ex-post 
analysis. Ex-post policy analysis is designed to evaluate past policy performance e.g., in terms 
of effectiveness, transparency, and distributional fairness to reach policy objectives and 
includes a wide range of methods, such as surveys, case studies, etc. The capability of these 
approaches, however, is limited since they do not provide for a way for evaluating the effects 
of policies prior to their implementation. In contrast, experiences with ex-ante evaluations are 
still rare (Blazek and Vozab 2006; Todd and Wolpin 2006). 
In the early phase of the policy life cycle, the Cost of Policy Inaction (COPI) method is 
often used as an ex-ante evaluation tool. In particular, COPI supports the policy recognition 
phase of the policy life cycle when the emphasis is on identifying problems, warning, 
communicating the need for policy action, and sketching the urgency of the policy problem 
relative to other issues. COPI is used to identify and quantify roughly the environmental 
damage occurring if no new policy is designed to address the underlying (environmental) 
problem or if the existing policies are not revised accordingly. COPI is not suitable, however, 
for comparing and choosing between different policy options, or for judging on the efficiency 
of policies (Bakkes et al. 2006).  
                                                 
1  We conceive policy options as (sets of) policy instruments that a policy maker intends to implement to reach a 
(set of) policy objectives; i.e., the policy instruments are not implemented at the time of the assessment. 
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Methods that support a later phase of the policy life cycle – the selection of policy options – 
are subsumed under the notion of ‘ex-ante impact assessment’. Here, the Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA) has become a prominent tool for policy makers to determine the least-cost 
alternative among a set of already available policy options. The systematic assessment and 
comparison of the relative costs and effects of given policy instruments allow for a 
prioritisation between options. CEA cannot, however, assess if a respective policy option is 
economically worthwhile (e.g., Postle et al. 2005; Whitby and Saunders 1996). Other methods 
that are used in this phase of the policy cycle usually comprise some form of simulation 
where potential actions are pre-tested in an artificial setting in order to gather information 
about possible consequences (Becker 2001: 315). There are two main forms of ex-ante impact 
assessment: a) Environmental Impact Assessment that is applied to assess planned projects, 
and b) Strategic Environmental Assessment that is used for the ex-ante impact assessment of 
policies. The various forms of ex-ante - mainly environmental - impact assessments that are 
conducted are often accompanied by social impact assessment (ibid: 312).  
Technology assessments as well as economic and fiscal impact assessments are often 
combined with social impact assessments, too. In the first step of a social impact assessment, 
scenarios are designed to sketch out possible future contexts for the actor system and the 
target system. Thereafter, strategies are designed that might be able to mitigate or even 
eliminate the problem. Here, various economic models are used in forecasting these 
strategies, i.e., the effects of a project or policy. For instance, Capello and Spairani (2004) use 
scenario building methodology to estimate growth and spatial distribution of the Gross 
Domestic Product in alternative scenarios for communication and infrastructure policies. 
Another example is provided by Todd and Wolpin (2006) who employ a dynamic behavioural 
model of schooling and fertility to forecast the effects of a program on school and work 
choices and on family fertility. In contrast, ex-ante impact assessment incorporating the 
institutional perspective of policy implementation has hardly been an issue in economic 
analysis. Further, while political science and sociology sometimes address institutional 
aspects in ex-ante impact assessments they do not focus on the effects institutions have on the 
(economic) decisions of individuals (e.g., North 1991).  
In cases where it is possible to quantify costs and benefits in monetary terms, a major tool 
for ex-ante impact assessment is the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). In contrast to COPI, CBA 
has a narrower and more concrete focus and tends to work with more specific data. Despite its 
widespread use, it has many practical and conceptual difficulties associated with monetising 
costs and, in particular, benefits of a proposed policy. This is particularly true in developing 
Ex-ante Policy Assessment from an Institutional Perspective 5 
 
and transition countries where methods of quantification are generally underdeveloped. 
Further, those countries are rather unfamiliar with systematic assessments of the benefits and 
costs of new regulations (Kirkpatrick et al. 2003). Due to the methodological difficulties to 
monetise costs and benefits, CBA is hardly objective and is slanted in various ideological 
directions. Thus, the role of CBA within a political context is often that of political argument, 
not scientific evidence (Bickers and Williams 2001; Kirkpatrick et al. 2003: 15). Other 
(supporting) valuation methods used for ex-ante policy analysis, such as Contingent 
Valuation, Travel Cost Method, and Hedonic Pricing try to capture the problem of monetising 
likely policy impacts. Still, from an institutional perspective, costs and frictions of policy 
design and implementation are not addressed by these methods; not the least because they are 
difficult to estimate and quantify ex-ante.  
Another way to come to ex-ante predictions of the likely impacts of policies or projects is 
to implement alternative versions of the policy in an experimental situation and to compare 
their relative impacts and effects. Despite the fact that such an experimental approach is often 
too costly and time consuming to be feasible for policy design purposes, in some cases 
experimental data has been used successfully to validate forecasting model outputs (Todd and 
Wolpin 2006). A particular form of these experiments is the ‘natural experiment’ 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000), a method where treatments are purposively randomised to 
overcome the problem of self-selection that often leads to misinterpretations.  
This brief overview shows that there is a lack of methods and procedures of institutional 
ex-ante evaluation of policies, let alone, reliable and good indicators. However, effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness (including transaction costs for design and implementation) of a 
particular policy depend, among other things, on the institutional environment and the 
institutional arrangements in place. There will be high transaction costs of implementation if 
the institutional context does not ‘fit’. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
approaches, there is a need to triangulate methods and to complement the tool box for ex-ante 
policy analysis from an institutional perspective. 
3 The Concept of Institutional Compatibility 
In this Section, we outline the basic assumptions underlying the concept of institutional 
compatibility used for the ex-ante institutional policy assessment introduced in this paper. 
Institutions are defined as the formal and informal rules of a society or of organisations that 
facilitate co-ordination among people by helping them form expectations. They also function 
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as constraints that shape human interaction and the enforcement characteristics of these 
constraints (North 1990: 3). Institutions do also define certain organisations, but these 
organisations are best thought of as not being institutions, but as being defined by institutions 
(Bromley 1989: 43). 
The institutional policy assessment is based on the assumption that policies will affect 
certain areas of reality, which are already subject to valid and (more or less) effective 
institutions. Thus, an adequate and correct understanding of the institutional configuration and 
of the situational logic of the institutional environment in which a policy is to be implemented 
is needed as a necessary precondition for assessing the balance between intended and 
unintended consequences of that policy. (Aligica 2005; Esty et al. 2005: 11; Bicker and 
Williams 2001: 235). To minimise unexpected and possibly disastrous outcomes, it is 
important that those who craft and modify rules do understand how particular combinations of 
rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular ecological and cultural environment (Ostrom 
2005: 3). This is particularly important for policy makers at higher administrative levels who 
often have no direct relation to the problems on the ground. Yet, according to Boettke and 
Coyne (2005), models of human interaction based on economic theory often have their 
problems and limitations in real social settings. Similarly, although aware of the 
oversimplification, most agri-environmental models used for policy assessment assume that 
with the implementation of a new policy the institutional arrangements conducive for that 
policy will be perfectly in place, or that a sub-optimal institutional arrangement will change 
automatically towards ‘perfection’ at once and with no costs. In addition, it is often assumed 
that the actors will comply with the policy.  
Given the paramount importance of the respective institutional context for policy 
implementation, the institutional assessment of policy options presented in this paper follows 
the concept of institutional compatibility. This concept refers to the compatibility between 
policy instruments and the respective institutional context to assess the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of policies. More precisely, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policies 
depend on the institutional arrangements (property rights and governance structures2) in place. 
Thus, on the one hand, appropriate institutions increase the likelihood of actually achieving 
the policy objectives, i.e., they increase the likelihood of actors’ compliance and (intended) 
                                                 
2  Governance structures are the organisational solutions for making rules (institutions) effective, i.e., they are 
necessary for guaranteeing the rights and duties and their use in co-ordinating transactions (e.g., Ostrom 
1990).  
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change of behaviour. On the other hand, appropriate institutions ensure that these policy 
objectives are achieved at reasonable costs. Policy instruments that have proven to be very 
cost-effective in one specific institutional context might perform rather poorly in another, i.e., 
they might not be effective at all, or they might induce higher costs to become effective. For 
example, a regulatory or command-and-control policy that puts a ceiling on the allowed 
amount of pesticides used per hectare and year might be ineffective if there is no authority in 
place to monitor and sanction farmers’ non-compliance. Here, effectiveness could be 
increased by establishing such an institutional mechanism; yet, the costs for establishing it 
might be substantial, thus, reducing the cost-effectiveness. The justifiable costs to be borne by 
society to make the policy effective cannot be defined by scientists; they depend upon public 
opinion and political will. However, the role of scientists can be to identify and to specify 
those transaction costs in a more transparent manner. This information would enable policy 
makers to design better policies and to make their choices on a more solid basis. 
In particular if agricultural, environmental, and rural policies are concerned, suitable 
governance structures have to address the specificities of nature-related transactions and the 
prevailing interdependencies of the actors, i.e., the fact that the choice of one actor may 
influence the choices other actors make. This problem is often overlooked in conventional 
economics which assumes that agents are independent (Paavola and Adger 2005) and largely 
ignors the complexity of nature-related transactions (Hagedorn et al. 2002). Political 
jurisdictions targeted by a policy have to match, in an appropriate manner, with the range of 
physical, economic, social and, in particular, institutional linkages found in the rural areas and 
in the agricultural sector. If carefully designed, governance structures can facilitate 
communication and co-ordination among diverse networks of stakeholders in EU agricultural, 
environmental, and rural policy making and beyond, thus, making effective policy 
implementation more likely. 
4 A Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) 
In the previous section, we argued that ex-ante policy assessment has to be linked to a 
comprehensive examination of the respective institutional environments in which policies will 
be implemented, i.e., the institutional contexts in which individuals and groups are seeking to 
act on their preferences and shared understandings (Bickers and Williams 2001: 234). Hence, 
the institutional assessment within the SEAMLESS project has been conceptualised to reveal 
where - i.e., in which country or region - a policy option would be compatible with the 
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existing institutional structures, and where an institutional misfit that is likely to hamper 
policy implementation can be expected.  
The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) comprises four distinct 
working steps:  
Step 1: The policy options are clustered according to a) type of intervention (regulatory, 
economic, and advisory), b) area of intervention (hierarchy/ bureaucracy, market, and self-
organised network), and c) possibly induced property rights changes. This classification 
allows identifying the generic structure of a policy option.  
Step 2: Each policy type is characterised by a specific set of crucial institutional aspects 
(CIA)3.  
Step 3: Indicators help to evaluate the potential of respective CIA to constrain or foster the 
implementation of a policy option. The institutional indicators4 are selected from existing 
indicator lists, perhaps modified, or new proxies are elaborated.5 Further, concrete 
assumptions on links and relationships between a CIA and the respective set of indicators are 
made.  
Step 4: The information provided by the institutional indicators is used for a qualitative 
assessment of each identified CIA. Subsequently, the CIA and the related assessments are 
arranged in thematic categories of institutional compatibility leading to qualitative statements 
about the probable effectiveness of a policy option. This allows for drawing conclusions about 
an institutional fit or misfit between policy options and institutional contexts.  
Accordingly, the results of the application of PICA are functioning as an early warning 
system as it sensitises the policy maker at a very early stage of the policy cycle to potential 
institutional incompatibilities that may prevent the proposed policies from being actually 
implemented or that make them less effective. The results of PICA can, thus, also serve as a 
starting point for a subsequent analysis of the causalities of the institutional incompatibilities 
                                                 
3  An initial list of 40 crucial institutional aspects linked to common policy types in agriculture, environment, 
and rural development has been compiled in the frame of the SEAMLESS project (Schleyer et al. 2007a: 
35ff.). In this paper, only selected crucial institutional aspects will be introduced.  
4  Institutional indicators are here defined as variables and proxies that are used as input to the institutional 
assessment within PICA. They do not represent the results and output of the institutional assessment.  
5  About 100 institutional indicators have been compiled so far in the frame of the SEAMLESS project 
(Schleyer et al. 2007a: 38ff.). 
Ex-ante Policy Assessment from an Institutional Perspective 9 
 
foreseen and for imploring possibilities to modify policies and/or the respective institutional 
environments to overcome these incompatibilities. 
5 Focussing PICA Step 1: Deriving Policy Types 
In this Section, we present the classification system which is used in PICA Step 1 to identify 
the generic structure of a policy option. The policy types introduced here offer a systematic 
way to classify policy options linked to agriculture, environment, or rural development that a 
policy maker might wish to assess. The particular type of intervention together with the area 
of intervention provide the basic information to describe a certain policy type. An additional 
dimension used to classify policy options is possibly induced property rights changes. The 
objective of this specification of policy types is to provide a suitable, yet formalised structure 
to identify crucial institutional aspects (CIA) that are of particular importance for the policy 
option under scrutiny. It is assumed that the policy type, as represented by distinct boxes in 
the matrix of Table 1, is decisive for the range and kind of crucial institutional aspects that 
can be expected to be conducive or detrimental to the implementation of this policy option. 
Practically, this typology allows limiting the number of CIA that needs to be reviewed when 
evaluating the policy to be implemented. In the absence of this classification or filter, all 
identified CIA relevant for agricultural, environmental, and rural development policies would 
have to be processed every time a policy option is to be assessed. In the following, the 
dimensions of the classification system will be explained in more detail. 
The types of intervention, i.e., the policy instruments are inscribed in the respective rows 
of the matrix in Table 1. They describe how and by which means the impact of a policy shall 
be reached:  
• Regulatory or command-and-control instruments (compulsory): e.g., laws, regulations, 
specific protection targets, and designations of areas for protected habitats or species.  
• Economic instruments often using financial (dis)incentives: e.g., taxes, subsidies, grants 
and loans, and tradable pollution permits. 
• Advisory/ Voluntary6 instruments: e.g., codes of good practice, extension services and 
other informative measures, and environmental audits.
                                                 
6  Of course, some economic polices, such as agri-environmental schemes, are also voluntary in character since 
farmers can choose to participate in those schemes, or not. In contrast, in this category, the term ’voluntary’ 
refers to policies that motivate voluntary actions or behavioural changes of actors without direct financial 
incentives or regulations, i.e., for example, by convincing actors using various kinds of information materials. 
   
Table 1: Policy Type Matrix 
Area of Intervention (Governance Structures) Property Rights Change   
Hierarchy/Bureaucracy Market Self-organised network Induced Not Induced 
Policies that  
induce changes in 
property rights for 
farmers regarding the 
natural resources they 
need for production 
using regulatory 
instruments 
Policies that 
do not induce 
such changes 
Regulatory 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
 
Example: Establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and Nature 
Reserves 
 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
 
Example: Restrictions on nitrate use 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks  
using regulatory (command-and-
control) instruments;  
 
Example: Implementing new European 
statutes for cooperatives 
Policies that 
induce changes in 
property rights for 
farmers regarding the 
natural resources they 
need for production 
using economic 
instruments 
Policies that  
do not induce 
such changes 
Economic 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using economic instruments;  
 
Example: Budget cuts for (regional) 
administrative bodies 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using economic instruments;  
 
Example: Subsidising organic milk 
and non-till farming practices 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks  
using economic instruments;  
 
Example: Providing funds for 
LEADER-Local Action Groups 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
Advisory/ 
Voluntary 
Policies that  
intervene at hierarchies/bureaucracies 
using advisory/voluntary instruments  
 
Example: Providing training material 
on efficient management structures 
and administrative procedures  
(Best Practice) 
Policies that  
intervene at markets  
using advisory/voluntary 
instruments;  
 
Example: Providing information 
brochures on health and organic food 
to consumers; providing training on 
environmental friendly farming 
 
Policies that  
intervene at self-organised networks  
using advisory/voluntary instruments  
 
Example: Providing information 
brochures with Best Practice-
examples; facilitating knowledge 
transfer between networks 
Policies that  
induce changes in 
property rights for 
farmers regarding the 
natural resources they 
need for production 
using 
advisory/voluntary 
instruments 
Policies that  
do not induce 
such changes 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
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This classification is based on the work of Stone (2002) who distinguishes between five 
general mechanisms for changing or coordinating behaviour of actors. These are 1) 
’inducements’, i.e., changing people’s behaviour with, often financial, rewards and 
punishments, here named economic instruments, 2) ’rules’, i.e., commands to act or not in 
certain ways, or determining permissions and entitlements, 3) ’rights’, i.e., strategies that 
allow individuals, groups or organisations to invoke government power on their behalf, 4) 
’powers’, i.e., shifting the power of decision making to different people, the last three are here 
subsumed under regulatory instruments, and, 5) ’facts’, i.e., strategies that rely principally on 
persuasion, here named advisory/ voluntary instruments. Stone (2002) also stresses that these 
instruments are ideal types and that no policy option ever relies purely on one type of 
instrument. A similar distinction is made by Moskowitz (1978: 65ff.) who analyses a wide 
range of alternative policy options that have the common objective to redirect financial 
investments from the private sector to ensure neighbourhood preservation. Here, Moskowitz 
distinguishes between three types of interventions: a) regulatory policies for mandatory 
investments, b) direct subsidies, such as tax benefits to change the final profit estimation, and 
c) persuasion by providing facts, figures, and experience to demonstrate that the private sector 
could realistically expect profits from these investments. This also corresponds with similar 
distinctions made by environmental economists (e.g., Stavins 2004). 
The area of intervention points to the governance structures a policy is supposed to have 
an impact on. More precisely, a policy aims at influencing real-world transactions (e.g., use of 
pesticides, protection of species, etc.) by changing existing or creating new governance 
structures that co-ordinate these transactions in such a way that, e.g., their results are 
internalised by the actors. The differentiation used in PICA follows to a large extent the 
widely used categories of governance structures (hierarchies, markets, and hybrids) suggested 
by Williamson (2004). However, first, it can be assumed that almost every governance 
structure in the real world can indeed be seen as some hybrid form between the polar cases 
market and hierarchy.7 Thus, in the respective columns of Table 1 those areas of intervention 
that are closer to either market or hierarchy are subsumed. Second, with specifying the third 
column self-organised network, the attention is directed to a specific (hybrid) form of 
                                                 
7  While in markets (repeated) economic exchange is based on voluntary bilateral agreements between 
individuals (e.g., auctions, stock markets, etc.), an authority on a higher level compulsorily selects economic 
action in hierarchies (e.g., state agencies, but also within private firms). 
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governance structures that is of particular interest if pursuing agricultural, environmental, and 
rural development policy objectives (Hagedorn 2002).  
The column property rights change is the third dimension to describe a policy type. It 
accounts for changes in private and collective property rights likely to be induced by the 
policy option, in particular, on natural resources. It covers an important institutional 
specificity of environmental policies. Undoubtedly, most policy options will imply some 
changes in property rights. However, here it is defined in a more narrow sense pointing to 
changes in the property rights of farmers on natural resources needed for production, such as 
land and water. For example, most environmental policies, such as the EU Flora-Fauna-
Habitat Directive or the EU Nitrate Directive, reduce directly farmers’ property rights. 
Restrictions on land use, like the prohibition to spread manure on the field during winter 
months, have direct impacts on the individual production decisions of farmers. Thus, these 
environmental policies, according to the matrix, would address the governance structure 
‘market’ as ‘area of intervention’ since restrictions in land use or farming practices are likely 
to affect the production function of the farmer resulting in higher production costs and, hence, 
less profit. Yet, these restrictions are also resulting in severe changes in and constraints on 
(private) property rights of farmers with respect to the (natural) production factor land. In 
contrast, policies demanding specific health and quality standards of a farmer’s produce to be 
kept when entering the market would also affect his production function; yet, no direct 
changes in property rights would be involved. 
To sum up, the three dimensions necessary to describe a policy type comprehensively are 
illustrated as a three-dimensional graphic in Figure 1. The x-axis describes the area of 
intervention, the y-axis the type of intervention, and the z-axis the dimension of property 
rights change. Each cuboid in the space represents a certain policy type. For illustration, the 
establishment of the European Food Safety Authority, a policy that intervenes at hierarchies 
using regulatory instruments and not directly influencing farmers` property rights, can be 
assigned to the policy type of the dark grey cuboid. 
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Figure 1: Three Dimensions of a Policy Type 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
6 Institutional Compatibility of the EU Nitrate Directive 
The EU Nitrate Directive (Council Directive 91/676/EEC) (EC 1991) that was adopted in 
1991 policy can be seen as a prominent and typical example of an EU environmental policy 
addressing water pollution. We take one of the core elements of this Directive as an example 
to illustrate PICA: when implementing the EU Nitrate Directive Member States have to draw 
up and implement action programmes in vulnerable zones designated before that shall consist 
of mandatory rules. These rules determine, e.g., periods when the application of certain types 
of fertiliser is prohibited, and limitations of the application rates of fertilisers taking into 
account the characteristics of the zones concerned, in particular soil conditions, soil type, 
slope, land use, and agricultural practices (see Annex III of the Directive). Furthermore, 
Member States have to establish suitable monitoring and enforcement systems to ensure 
actors’ compliance with the rules. 
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Being aware that the Nitrate Directive comprises more and different policy elements that can 
be combined in diversified ways, to illustrate PICA we only refer to the uncompensated and 
mandatory production restrictions in previously defined vulnerable zones. We focus on this 
element of the EU Nitrate Directive and treat it as a single policy instrument and, therewith, 
abstract from distorting effects due to the other - certainly interdependent - policy elements 
that would also be implemented when the Directive were to be introduced.  
 
6.1 PICA Step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 
Using all available information on the concrete form and content of the policy option 
provided by the policy maker the PICA expert team8 categorises this element of the EU 
Nitrate Directive – according to the matrix of policy types (see Table 1) – as a regulatory type 
of policy having effects on markets. As described above, it demands from the Member States 
that action programmes are to be implemented that shall consist, among other things, of 
clearly defined mandatory measures determined in Annex III. Effectively, only the national 
regulations determine the precise limits of restrictions in time and space. Further, it is 
assumed that no compensations are paid covering the costs induced by these restrictions.9 
These uncompensated restrictions have an impact on the production costs of farmers (e.g., 
because yields decrease due to restrictions in fertiliser use) and, thus, on their position at the 
market. More precisely, farmers might be forced to offer their products at a higher price 
resulting in a decrease in demand for those products or they might keep the price and accept 
reduced profits. The respective impact levels of the restrictions on the production costs of 
farmers, however, depend on a variety of factors, such as farming practices before 
implementation of the restrictions, size and type of the agricultural enterprise, soil fertility, 
and share of land farmed by the agricultural firm that is affected by the restrictions. Clearly, in 
some cases the restrictions may not impose any further costs, e.g., because fertilisers have not 
been used in the agricultural firm anyway. 
 
                                                 
8  The PICA expert team is part of the SEAMLESS expert team that is carrying out the policy assessment - on 
behalf of the policy maker - using the ‘SEAMLESS Integrated Framework’ after the research project is 
finished. 
9  However, national laws to implement the EU Nitrate Directive may be complemented with various forms of 
compensation schemes that ease the burden for some stakeholders in general, or in selected areas.  
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6.2 PICA Step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects Related to the Policy Option 
According to the identification of the policy type in the previous step, in PICA Step 2, only 
those CIA related to regulatory policy instruments intervening in markets have to be 
considered. Within the SEAMLESS project, an extensive literature review has been carried 
out to identify CIA that are typically linked with respective policy types (see Schleyer et al. 
2007a: appendix 2). Based on this compiled ‘library of crucial institutional aspects’, those 
CIA are extracted that potentially hamper or foster the effective implementation of policies of 
the type ‘regulatory on market’, thus, accruing also to the selected core element of the EU 
Nitrate Directive, in particular, to the implementation of restrictions in fertiliser use. During 
the application of PICA, relevant national and regional stakeholders and scientific experts are 
consulted by the PICA expert team discussing the relevance of every identified CIA for the 
policy option under scrutiny. Here, some of the CIA extracted from the initial literature 
review might be regarded as relevant for a policy type in general, but not be considered as 
crucial for the specific policy option to be assessed. Thus, the PICA expert team can decide to 
skip some CIA at this stage. In turn, additional CIA that have not yet been covered by the 
literature reviewed may be included in the assessment of the policy option under scrutiny and 
may also be added to the library of crucial institutional aspects. As a result of the consultation 
process, the following CIA likely to constrain the implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive 
were suggested and are presented here for illustrative purposes:10  
• Strong bargaining power of farmers’ associations  
Implementation of mandatory measures restricting the use of fertilisers in designated 
vulnerable zones affects directly the production costs of farmers in these zones, often leading 
to income losses. Yet, the (degree of the) concrete restrictions is determined by the respective 
Member States or regions. Here, it is assumed that a strong agricultural lobby might be able to 
weaken these mandatory restrictions, or to obtain exception clauses. Thus, strong farmers’ 
associations might hamper the effective implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive.  
• Information asymmetry state vs. firm and high level of opportunism 
                                                 
10  We do not claim that the CIA presented here are indeed the most relevant crucial institutional aspects related 
to the selected core element of the EU Nitrate Directive. Yet, we deem them to be reasonably relevant and 
sufficiently plausible since they are based on the extensive literature review mentioned above and on 
discussions within the PICA group within the SEAMLESS project. 
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Information asymmetries between public administrations (state) and agricultural producers 
can be conceived as the result of problems on part of the state to control and monitor the 
activities of firms. These problems depend, among other things, on the ability 
(technical/knowledge/human resources) or even willingness of the administration in charge to 
monitor and, if applicable, sanction actors’ behaviour, but also on the characteristics of the 
resources (and the related activities to be monitored) concerned. Mandatory measures to 
reduce water pollution by nitrates are difficult – or very costly – to observe and to measure, 
e.g., the exact amount of nitrates applied per hectare. Thus, farmers’ non-compliance with 
prescribed restrictions is not easy to detect and/or non-compliance cannot be associated 
clearly with single farmers since nitrates diffuse slowly into often large groundwater basins. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that high levels of opportunism on part of the farmers concerned 
are likely to exacerbate the problem leading to high costs for controlling necessary to deter 
actors from cheating. 
 
6.3 PICA Step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects to Institutional Indicators 
As a result of PICA Step 2, the PICA expert team suggests a restricted list of CIA that is 
considered to be of particular importance for assessing the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of implementing the selected core element of the EU Nitrate Directive. Those 
CIA that are selected from the library of CIA are linked with at least one institutional 
indicator from the available portfolio (see Footnote 5) that can help to evaluate the respective 
CIA, eventually leading to statements about the effectiveness of policy implementation in 
PICA Step 4. For further processing, only those indicators are selected that are considered to 
have some explanatory power with respect to the policy option under scrutiny. At this stage, 
the PICA expert team has to interact with other members of the SEAMLESS expert team, in 
particular with modelling and data base experts. Here, the availability, quality, and 
geographical scope of quantitative data need to be discussed. Further, the precise forms and 
scopes of suggested qualitative assessments need to be decided on.  
For illustration, Tables 2 - 4 contain examples of institutional indicators that might be used 
for assessing the extent of the selected CIA.  
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Table 2: Institutional Indicators for Assessing the CIA ‘Bargaining power of farmers’ 
associations’  
Institutional 
Indicator 
Description / Data Data Sources / 
Databases 
Expert assumptions on 
links between indicator 
and CIA11 
Memberships in 
farmers‘ 
associations 
Number of farmers that are member in a 
farmers‘ association / Number of 
farms*100 
National 
Statistical 
Databases; 
Assessment by 
expert group 
High percentages indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers’ associations 
Fragmentation 
of farmers‘ 
associations 
Number of farmers’ associations National 
Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
relatively weak (total) 
bargaining power of farmers‘ 
associations 
Proximity 
between 
farmers’ 
associations and 
EU authorities 
(Number of) farmers’ associations (of a 
country) with official representatives in 
Brussels 
Data assembled 
by expert group 
A high number indicates a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and 
strong bargaining power 
Structure of 
farming system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of 
people employed in the farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
A low ratio indicates a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms (latifundium 
system) and, thus, a high 
influence on the political 
decision making process at 
national level 
Producer 
Support 
Estimate 
Monetary budget of producer support (e.g., 
market price support, payments based on 
overall farming income, etc.) in a country 
OECD High estimates indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers’ associations 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
                                                 
11  Please note that this column will contain specific assumptions on links between indicator, CIA, and policy 
option when actually running PICA. It will be filled by the PICA expert team after discussing the relevance 
and sufficiency of available indicators for evaluating the identified CIA with respect to the concrete policy 
option. This process is also likely to produce a restricted (smaller) list of those institutional indicators related 
to a respective CIA that can be linked meaningfully with the policy option under scrutiny. 
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Table 3:  Institutional Indicators for Assessing the CIA ‘Information asymmetry state 
vs. firm’  
Information 
asymmetry 
Methodology to identify information 
asymmetry: 1.) Identify potential sources of 
information asymmetry related to the policy 
under scrutiny; 2.) Evaluate the impact of 
this information asymmetry on the efficiency 
of this policy; 3.) Assess the additional 
controlling and monitoring costs necessary to 
reduce the level of information asymmetry to 
an ‘acceptable’ level 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
High additional 
controlling and 
monitoring costs 
necessary to reach an 
‘acceptable’ level of 
information asymmetry 
indicate a high constraint 
Affinity of 
governments 
towards 
devolution 
Degree of affinity of the government of a 
country towards devolution 
Qualitative 
assessment by 
expert group 
Low degrees indicate 
high information 
asymmetries since 
centralised control and 
monitoring is more costly
Farm 
density 
Average number of farms per 100 ha SEAMLESS 
Databases 
High numbers indicate 
higher controlling and 
monitoring cost, thus, 
likely higher information 
asymmetries 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence 
World Bank Low measures indicate 
an ineffective/inefficient 
existing controlling and 
monitoring system 
causing information 
asymmetries 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
Table 4: Institutional Indicators for Assessing the CIA ‘High level of opportunism’  
Infringement cases Number of infringement cases in a country 
brought before the Court of Justice  
National Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers of 
infringement cases 
indicate high levels of 
opportunism 
Rule of Law Composite indicator of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence 
World Bank Low measures indicate 
high levels of 
opportunism 
Order Assessment of popular observance of the law 
(Part of composite indicator ‘Rule of Law’) 
World Bank Low measures indicate 
high levels of 
opportunism 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
6.4 PICA Step 4: Aggregating Information on the Selected Crucial Institutional 
Aspects  
In this final step of PICA, the expert team that runs PICA with the help of external scientific 
experts and stakeholders is using the information provided by the institutional indicators for a 
qualitative assessment of the restricted list of CIA. This includes, first, combining the various 
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indicator information available for every single CIA of the restricted list to arrive at a 
qualitative statement about the relative extent of this CIA in all countries and/or regions. For 
example, the level of corruption can be determined for every country where the policy option 
is to be implemented, thus, providing insights in the relative - country-wise - likelihoods for 
ineffective policy implementation. Second, the PICA expert team is defining thematic 
categories of institutional compatibility to group the CIA and the respective qualitative 
statements. While it is certainly helpful to use science-driven categories, such as property 
rights compatibility, embeddedness compatibility, etc., policy makers who commissioned the 
assessment might prefer different or additional categories. Each thematic category draws on 
information from at least one CIA. For the selected core element of the EU Nitrate Directive 
the PICA expert team suggests to group the information according to the following two 
thematic categories: 
1) Communication capacity 
• Bargaining power of farmers’ associations 
2) Governance structures compatibility 
• Information asymmetry state vs. firm (including high levels of opportunism) 
Finally, these categorised region- or country-wise qualitative statements on the compatibility 
of the policy option will be presented to the policy maker who has commissioned the policy 
assessment with the ‘SEAMLESS Integrated Framework’. Here, an interactive form of 
communication is preferred since this provides the opportunity to discuss the results and, 
perhaps, the introduction of complementary policy instruments in countries or regions where 
– according to the PICA results – implementation is likely to be substantially hampered. 
Figure 2 summarises the four steps of PICA.
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Figure 2: Scheme of the Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
7 Conclusion 
The methodological and theoretical conceptualisation of PICA is a novel approach that takes 
the perspective of a policy maker who intends to influence the behaviour of actors when 
designing and implementing new policies. Unlike perhaps a scientist, he/she may in the first 
place not be interested in a detailed analysis of the institutional dynamics on the ground. 
Instead, he/she rather wants to know if a potential policy is likely to change actors’ behaviour 
in such a way that the policy objectives can be reached. Consequently, PICA has been 
designed as an explorative tool that is able to identify main institutional incompatibilities that 
might act against policy implementation. Thus, PICA can be considered as an early warning 
system for institutional incompatibilities. PICA results point to (potential) institutional 
incompatibilities, however, without providing detailed insights in the concrete (region and 
policy dependent) causalities that lead to these institutional compatibilities; thus, further 
empirical analysis would be necessary to design specific and optimal instruments to overcome 
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or mitigate those incompatibilities. Here, the overall importance of PICA within the policy 
making process reaches well beyond exploring institutional incompatibilities since the PICA 
results allow for a very much focussed design of such a subsequent institutional analysis. All 
in all, PICA may help to avoid irreversible investments for policy design and implementation 
since the policy makers gets informed at an early stage whether the results he/she expects may 
not materialise and, thus, he/she may be able to stop these ineffective investments. 
Furthermore, PICA provides a flexible structure within the four steps that can be adapted very 
easily to all possible agricultural, environmental, and rural policy options and institutional 
contexts. It allows for a low-cost and time-saving research and the results are easy to 
communicate to policy makers.  
PICA can also play an important role within integrated modelling frameworks – like the 
SEAMLESS-Integrated Framework - that have been developed for an ex-ante assessment of 
policy impacts on environmental, economic, and social systems. Here, the economic and 
environmental models often assume that appropriate and required institutions are in place for 
resource governance towards sustainability, or that those institutions can be implemented with 
no costs. PICA can be seen as a method that qualifies those underlying modelling 
assumptions to narrow the gap between theory and the real-world. Thereby, the institutional 
assessment can strengthen the modelling approaches in the pre- and post-modelling phase. If 
PICA is applied in the pre-modelling phase, it can provide hints on whether institutional 
constraints in some or many countries or regions are likely to be prohibitively high and the 
policy option will hardly become effective there. As a result, it could be recommended - and 
discussed with the policy makers - to modify the policy option or to carry out additional in-
depth institutional pre-studies before running the other models. Similarly, the results can be 
used to select and modify policy scenarios that are constructed as input for the modelling 
tools. When applying PICA in the post-modelling phase, it allows for putting the mainly 
quantitative model results and calculated impact indicators into (institutional) context. This 
contributes to the validation of the model results on policy impacts.  
PICA is still work in progress. It has been tested in the Auvergne (France) to gain more 
insights for modifying and refining the procedure (see Schleyer et al. 2007b for preliminary 
results). Despite being an explorative tool, all PICA steps can build already on a solid basis 
derived from theoretical insights and empirical institutional analysis (see Schleyer et al. 
2007a). Neither the current library of crucial institutional aspects (CIA) as a whole nor the 
lists of CIA linked to a particular policy type can be seen as static, but need to be revised and 
complemented continually to improve the accuracy of the predictions. Therefore, it is 
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essential that the experiences made and insights gained during every application of PICA are 
used systematically and carefully to make the empirical basis of PICA more comprehensive. 
Thus, the library of CIA can be seen as an ever-growing source of information. The same 
applies to the library of institutional indicators used in PICA Step 3 that would need constant 
revision. Further main avenues for improvement would also include testing the ability of the 
typology of policy options to actually filter the CIA properly. Is the current typology indeed 
able to account for those essential characteristics of a policy option that are determining the 
range of crucial institutional aspects relevant for this policy? Does the filter exclude CIA that 
may turn out to be relevant in PICA Step 2 (too exclusive)? Does the filter include (many) 
CIA that may turn out to be irrelevant or less relevant (too inclusive)? The preliminary testing 
results clearly underline the need for a constant revision or calibration of the current policy 
matrix with every application of PICA (Schleyer et al. 2007b). Similarly, one may ask if the 
typology covers those main features of a policy option that are important for the success of 
policy implementation. An important aspect not yet addressed by the current typology, for 
example, is the dimension of the bio-physical system (or natural resource system) that is 
addressed by a policy. Here, some crucial institutional aspects can stem from the fact that the 
characteristics of a natural resource addressed – or, more precisely, the attributes of a nature-
related transaction that is induced or influenced by the policy - might call for specific 
institutional arrangements to make a policy option effective (Hagedorn et al. 2002). For 
instance, addressing water quality often has to deal with non-point pollution from agriculture 
that constitutes challenges for adequate forms of monitoring and sanctioning. Further, policies 
for the protection of biodiversity or specific rare species face particular incentive problems, 
not the least because the future value of these rare species is uncertain and the benefits of 
protection cannot only be reaped by the one protecting it. In addition, the geographical 
dimensions (local, national, or global) of resources can also be important. Thus, distinct 
institutional aspects for each of the natural resources addressed can be expected. This clearly 
illustrates that PICA needs to be further developed and the resulting concept tested as a valid 
and innovative tool to capture institutional dimensions in ex-ante policy assessment.  
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